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Abstract
We simulate a closed rental housing market with search and match-
ing frictions, in which both landlord and tenant agents are imperfectly
informed of the characteristics of the market. Landlords, who observe a
random sample of market offered rents, decide what rent to post based
on the expected effect of the rent on the time-on-the-market (TOM) re-
quired to find a tenant. Tenants are heterogeneous in income. Each
tenant observes their idiosyncratic preference for a random offer and de-
cides whether to accept the offer or continue searching, based on their
imperfect knowledge of the offered ret distribution.
The steady state to which the simulation evolves shows price disper-
sion, nonzero search times and vacancies. We further assess the effects of
increasing information on either side of the market. Tenants’ information
level has a positive effect on their welfare. Conversely, landlords are bet-
ter off when they have less information. In that case they underestimate
the TOM and so the steady-state of the market moves to higher rents.
However, when landlords with different levels of information are present
on the market, the better informed are consistently better off.
The model allows the analysis of the dynamics. It is observed that
dynamic shocks to the discount rate can provoke overshoots in rent ad-
justments due in part to landlords use of outdated information in their
rent posting decision.
1
1 Introduction
In the urban rental housing market two categories of agents meet. The first
category consists of landlords who post rents. The second category consists
of tenants who choose among offers. These markets are imperfect as can be
seen by the existence of vacancies, price dispersion and nonzero search times
for all agents. One source of imperfection is that both categories of agents are
imperfectly informed about the characteristics of the market, and acquiring in-
formation is costly. Take for instance the tenants. Visiting more residences gives
them more information but is costly and so tenants may accept an offer quickly
to avoid further search costs. Moreover the market state (rents, apartments on
the market etc) changes over time, making previously acquired information less
useful or even misleading. Likewise, the landlords observe times-on-the-market
required to find a tenant for a given rent but this observation does not give
them perfect information about the preferences of the tenants and the state of
the market.
These imperfections in comparison to the theoretical perfectly competitive
market are referred to as frictions and more particularly as search frictions. The
impact of frictions has been extensively studied in search-matching models of
the labor market. A survey of search theoretic models of the labor market by
Rogerson et al. (2005) presents the various approaches to modeling the main
search related frictions: how agents meet and how wages are determined. Search
models have been less systematically used in the existing housing market liter-
ature, although existing contributions provide a major understanding of several
features of housing markets.
The first major contribution to the housing market literature based on this
pre-existing labor market literature is that of Wheaton (1990). He created a
model of the owner-occupier market in which buyers are also sellers and the cost
of search effort and its efficiency are defined by an exogenous matching function.
This model was later extended to a spatial rental market by Desgranges and
Wasmer (2000) who studied notably a tax on vacancies. The ‘thin’ nature of
the housing rental market due to the heterogeneity of housing and tenants’
idiosyncratic tastes has been used to explain vacancies by Arnott (1989). The
existence of vacancies is shown to have a social function as it expands the choice
set of tenants. Further theoretical models of the housing market are discussed
in Section 2.2. All of these static analytical models contain strong simplifying
assumptions which ignore important aspects of the housing market. Among
these assumptions are the ‘law of one price’, the absence of heterogeneities and
perfect information on the state of the market. Certain of these assumptions
are relaxed in the models mentioned above but never all together in a general
equilibrium model.
The contribution of the present paper is to propose a multi-agent model as a
basis for relaxing many of the assumptions of analytical models in order to obtain
a more realistic dynamic model of housing markets. The evolution of rents is
influenced by many factors including interest rates, conditions of credit, land
supply and zoning, the economic environment, incomes, demographics etc. All of
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these factors cannot be easily integrated into a single model. Here, we attempt to
determine the generic effects that result from the fundamental market structure
of heterogeneous agents searching with imperfect information. Our aim is to
build a model close enough to the existing search literature for its results to be
comparable, while allowing the extension of these existing models in different
directions.
We develop a simulation model of a closed urban housing market focusing on
the role of information. van der Vlist et al. (2002) proposed a general equilib-
rium search model of the housing market with rent-setting landlords who know
the acceptance probability of any rent offer and with searching tenants who
optimize their behaviors based on the trade-off between the expected benefit of
searching and random rent offers. Our agents behave following the same rule.
However, our model departs from van der Vlist’s hypotheses in the first place
by allowing the quantity of information available to landlords and tenants to
vary. In particular, landlord agents do not know the acceptance probability of
all tenants searching on the market. Following important results found in the
literature (e.g. Clayton et al. (2008)), the rate at which information arrives
affects the quality of landlord’s estimation of the market state. The discrepancy
in the results which ensues from these differences with the analytical models is
highlighted. In particular, we examine changes in the steady state configura-
tion due to alterations in the level of information available to agents. Our model
also allows to model the dynamics following macroeconomic shocks such as an
abrupt changes in the discount rate.
The major results concern the different influences of the level of information
on both sides of the market. Increasing tenants’ information benefits tenants
by decreasing rents and hence increasing their welfare. It is however notable
that this positive effect saturates at low levels of information. Landlords are
penalized when they are better informed, as when they are less well-informed
underestimations of the TOM move the market to higher rents which are ac-
cepted by the tenants. However, when landlords are heterogeneous in informa-
tion, the better informed are better off. The role of information in the market’s
reaction to a shock in the discount rate is examined. ‘Errors’ in landlords initial
reactions to changing market conditions resulting from their backward looking
accumulation of market signals over time can be seen.
Section 2 presents related theoretical, empirical and simulation literature. In
Section 3 the model is presented. The comparative static results are presented
in Section 4 along with the results of simulations with an exogenous shock to the
discount rate. A comparison of these results with the literature is discussed in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. The appendices present the comparative statics
due to changes in tenant’s information levels and also graphs from sensitivity
tests with variations in the other model parameters.
3
2 Related literature
2.1 Empirical literature
We review here the empirical work on the main phenomena related to frictions
in the housing market: agent’s information, vacancies, time on the market and
price setting, and price dispersion.
Blanck and Winnock (1953) made a major contribution to the understanding
of vacancies’ role in determining urban housing price dynamics. They showed
that price dynamics appear to be led by changes in the vacancy rate. A more
thorough analysis was performed by Rosen and Smith (1983) who provided
evidence, in a cross city analysis, of the existence of natural vacancy rates that
are crucial in determining the strong correlations between fluctuations in the
vacancy rate and the evolution of rents. Numerous authors report similar results
including Gabriel and Nothaft (1988) in the rental housing market, Shilling et al.
(1987), Grenadier (1995) in the office rental market and Hwang and Quigley
(2006) in the purchasing housing market.
The role of information in the evolution of housing markets has received much
attention. Fisher et al. (2003) studied the correlations in prices and liquidity
changes over the housing market cycle. It is well known that when prices rise
liquidity is high and when prices fall liquidity is low. They attributed this to
the differing rates at which agents update their beliefs. For example, when
liquidity is low, there are few market signals for sellers to follow, causing them
to be slow to update their beliefs. Clayton et al. (2008) examined a number
of possible explanations of the correlations in price and liquidity changes, and
found evidence supporting sellers slow rate for updating their beliefs.
The price setting behavior and the relation between prices and selling times
has been closely studied, primarily in the residential purchasing market. (Yavas
and Yang, 1995, Knight, 2002, Anglin et al., 2003) have shown that in the sell-
ing market a house with a higher asking price generally takes longer to sell,
particularly in thick markets. This has been confirmed in the rental market for
single family housing by Allen et al. (2009). Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004)
have also looked at posted price changes and found that when reductions in ask-
ing price occur, they are generally substantial rather than incremental. Cheng
et al. (2009) review rents studies of the relationship between asking price and
TOM in housing markets, they conclude that there is convincing evidence that
a negative relationship exists.
2.2 Theoretical literature
As a benchmark to the analysis of housing markets, it is worth recalling briefly
the two parallel paths followed in search-matching models of the labor market,
which accounts for a large part of the search literature in economics. On one
hand, models aimed at analyzing varying unemployment rates have focused on
the matching function and search behaviors on the part of workers (Pissarides,
1990, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). On the other hand, models aiming to
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explain the observed dispersion of wages have highlighted the behaviors of wage
posting firms that benefit from the existence of frictions to offer wages below
the Walrasian wage (Burdett and Mortensen, 1989, 1998, Mortensen, 1990).
Mortensen (2000) builds a model merging the two approaches. He underlines
the contribution of doing so: by allowing for a general equilibrium in which the
wage distribution and the unemployment rate interact, this model allows the
study of the welfare effect of a minimum wage or of an unemployment subsidy
policy.
Literature on search on the housing market, although less systematically
developed, followed two similar strands. Wheaton (1990) and Desgranges and
Wasmer (2000) are interested in explaining the existence of vacancies and con-
sider a matching function with a Nash bargaining on rents. Arnott (1989) pro-
posed a rent-posting model with no search costs on the part of the tenants but
with idiosyncratic tastes that give some monopoly power to the sellers. Read
(1993, 1997) developed two search models of the rental market with rent-setting
landlords. Both papers are partial equilibrium model with tenants engaged in
non-sequential search. They provide insightful results regarding the role of im-
perfect information on rent dispersion and existence of vacancies. Read (1993)
considers tenants with heterogeneous search intensities but identical exogenous
reservation rents. In Read (1997), searchers all visit more than one housing but
differ by their reservation rent. A distribution of rents arises as the outcome
of landlords having some monopoly power due to imperfectly informed tenants.
Vacancies are the consequence of the possibility of profit exhaustion through free
entry of landlords. In these models, there is a strong asymetry between tenants
and landlords: whereas tenants base their acceptation on a limited number of
offers, landlords compute their expected profit knowing perfectly tenants be-
havior.
van der Vlist et al. (2002) extend this analysis by considering a more general
search model in which both landlords and tenants optimize their behavior taking
the market state into account. Indeed, tenants receive rent offers that they
trade-off against the benefit they have if they continue searching. However, the
model does not account for heterogeneities in tastes, search costs or housing
characteristics.
Due to their analytical resolution, these models are limited as to the hetero-
geneities that can be taken into account. More important, all of these models
are static approaches of which only the steady-state can be analyzed, although
dynamics are very important in real estate markets. As noted by Arnott (1989)
"It will be of interest to examine how the behavior of the market differs when it
is either growing or contracting, or when it is subject to anticipated or unantici-
pated shocks and policy changes." (Arnott, 1989, p. 23) One contribution in this
direction is Cheng et al. (2009), who studies the effects of changing market con-
ditions on sale prices and TOM in the presence of heterogeneously constrained
sellers.
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2.3 Simulation literature
The difficulty of studying out-of-equilibrium dynamics in analytical search mod-
els with price dispersion has been underlined by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006).
Agent-based modeling has considerable advantages over analytical approaches
when modeling dynamic processes and heterogeneities among agents. In such
models, the agents themselves, their behaviors and their possible interactions
are defined initially and the simulation evolves independently in rounds of in-
teractions. The results of the simulation are the sequence of decisions taken
by agents and their outcome can be analyzed using standard empirical meth-
ods. Aspects of the model specification can be altered and the corresponding
changes in the outcome analyzed. In this way, according to Bradburd et al.
(2006) “...agent-based modeling permits formation of testable hypotheses about
the likely impacts of comparable changes in actual markets or systems”.
A notable and very detailed multi-agent model of the 1970’s French labor
market was constructed by Ballot (2002). As to the housing market, Bradburd
et al. (2005, 2006) use agent-based simulations to relax the assumption of a
single price with random matching and Nash bargaining in two rental housing
models. These static models examine the distributional effects of rent controls
(Bradburd et al., 2006) and ‘access discrimination’ (Bradburd et al., 2005),
modeled as a reduced matching probability. Those analyses however do not
model search behavior.
3 Model
In our rental housing search model, homogeneous landlords post rents and make
take-it-or-leave-it offers to the tenants, who are heterogeneous in income. These
landlords face a trade-off between setting a higher rent and finding a tenant more
quickly. Their optimizing behavior is based on their knowledge of the market
state, both in terms of rent offers and corresponding times-on-the-market. They
withdraw from the market if their expected benefit from participation is nega-
tive.
Tenants are supposed to observe a sample of the offer distribution and to
visit one randomly chosen residence each iteration. They accept offers based on
an optimizing behavior that trade-offs a quicker match, and therefore reduced
search costs, against a lower rent. Tenants must decide their reservation utility
Ures, that is the minimum utility they are willing to accept from a residence.
This reservation utility is chosen to determine whether a residence they have
viewed is better in expectation than the outside opportunity, which is to continue
searching with the associated costs. Each iteration, housed tenants have an
exogenous probability 1/X to leave their apartment and become searchers.
We see in the top part of Figure 1 the timing of the tenant agents’ reservation
utility decision and its consequences. At each iteration (time zero), every tenant
agent decides their reservation utility Ures, which determines their search time
T (Ures) in expectation. While searching they experience a (negative) utility
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Figure 1: Tenants’ and landlords’ timing of decisions and their utilities. When
landlords revise the rent of vacant residences the procedure is repeated.
flow UTs . Ures, by determining the acceptable offers, also determines in expec-
tation their utility flow once housed UT
h
. The expected duration of residence of
tenants X is an exogenous constant, and hence T (Ures) + X is the total time
over which tenant agents optimize their expected utility; this is a reasonable
approximation for the rental market, see de Una-Alvarez et al. (2008).
The bottom part of Figure 1 shows the timing of the landlords rent posting
decision and its consequences. Landlords choose their posted rent R at time
zero, which determines their expected time-on-the-market T (R) and clearly
their utility flow once their residence is occupied. Landlords obtain the utility
flow ULvac while their residence is vacant, and the utility flow U
L
occ once their
residence is occupied. Note that if landlords review the posted rent of a vacant
apartment, the moment of decision is taken once more to be time zero.
In the following, we outline more specifically the proposed agent behaviors,
the simulation procedure as well as the dimensions of heterogeneity and the
parameters whose influence on simulation outcomes shall be explored.
3.1 Tenants
We now describe in detail how tenant agents trade-off between, on one hand,
minimizing the cost of searching and on the other hand, maximizing the eventual
utility obtained from housing. Tenants decide their reservation utility Ures
and obtain Uh from the market, after experiencing a negative utility U
T
s while
searching.
Tenant agents’ have a separable utility function whose housing part differs
depending on their situation on the housing market. When housed, the agent’s
instantaneous utility flow from ’housing’ is given by:
UTh = Y −R + η ≥ 0 (1)
where UT
h
is the instantaneous utility flow, Y is housing budget, R is the
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rent paid and η is the idiosyncratic preference of an agent for an apartment,
discovered by the agent once the apartment is visited. η ∼ N(0, σ), where
σ is the variance of the normally distributed idiosyncratic preferences. σ is
expressed as a percentage of the housing budget, as shown in Table 3.3.3 in
Section 3.3.3. The introduction of stochastic idiosyncratic preferences adds an
important element of heterogeneity to the model. A positive effect of including
heterogeneities was remarked in Kirman (1992). 1
While searching, the agent’s instantaneous utility flow from ’housing’ is given
by:
UTs = Y − CT < 0 (2)
where CT is the monetarised cost of searching, including both actual costs
(temporary accommodation costs, transport costs, lost earnings and estate
agency fees) and non-monetary inconveniences.2 It is homogeneous across ten-
ant agents.
Each tenant is fully described by his housing budget Y . In this simple model,
this represents the maximum price she is willing to pay to rent an apartment
(assuming neutral idiosyncratic preferences) and is a fixed percentage of income.
It is uniformly distributed among fifty groups of tenants in the range [100,198].
Tenant agents have heterogeneous incomes which translate into heteroge-
neous housing budgets for the purpose of this model. Unhoused tenant agents
search every iteration. A searching agent sees one randomly chosen apartment
from the distribution of offers, which is referred to as undirected search in the
search literature. Upon visiting an apartment, agents have to decide whether to
accept it or keep searching. This will depend upon their idiosyncratic preference
for the apartment, the posted rent, their housing budget and the cost of search.
It also depends on their outside opportunity, that is the value they have while
continuing searching, which they assess - imperfectly - based on their knowledge
of a percentage ST of the full distribution of offers.
Ures is optimized to yield the maximum utility per unit time over the ex-
pected period of search and residence. Tenant agents idiosyncratic preferences
are supposed not to play any role in this decision. The expected benefit per
unit time for a given reservation utility is given by
BT (Ures) =
UTs
X + T (Ures)
T (Ures)∫
0
exp(rt)dt+
1This is the result of heterogeneous agents changing their behaviours in different ways. If
all agents are homogeneous then they shall adopt the same behaviours and abrupt system
level changes will follow from any synchronised change in individual behaviour.
2Note that this negative utility can be interpreted as causing either reduced consumption
of the composite good (all non-housing expenses) to cover temporary accommodation costs
or that UTs represents a non-monetary disutility, or a combination of both.
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E
[
U
T
h
]
X + T (Ures)
T (Ures)+X∫
T (Ures)
exp(rt)dt (3)
where UTs is the utility flow experienced while searching, X is the expected
duration of residence, T (Ures) is the expected search time, r is the discount rate
and E
[
U
T
h
]
is the expected utility flow per iteration once housed if the chosen
reservation utility is Ures. Equation (3) is rewritten:
BT (Ures) =
UTs
X + T (Ures)
[1− exp (−rT (Ures))] +
E
[
U
T
h
]
X + T (Ures)
[exp (−rT (Ures)) ∗ (1− exp (−rX))] . (4)
The first line in Equations (3) & (4) are the total expected discounted search
cost divided by the full expected duration of search and residency. The second
line is the discounted total expected utility flow during residency divided by the
full expected duration of search and residency. Equation (3) is similar to that
used by Igarashi (1991) for the expected discounted housing costs of a searcher.
This equation differs from it however, as here we take the expected benefit
per unit time. Also, for the sake of simplicity, we do not explicitly include in
the agents’ optimization the discounted expected benefit upon re-entering the
market after the tenant eventually leaves the residence. This choice does not
impact the qualitative results of the model in a context where agents assume
the market state to be constant.
The expected probability of accepting the residence visited in any given
iteration is simply the number of residences the agent is prepared to accept
divided by the total number of residences, both quantities being taken from the
offers that the agent sees. As this is a Poisson process, the expected search time
T (Ures) in iterations is equal to the inverse of the probability of accepting a
residence at each iteration. The expected utility flow per iteration once housed
E
[
U
T
h
]
, is given by the average utility of residences which are expected to yield
utilities larger than Ures:
E
[
U
T
h
]
=
∑
UT
h
∗ φ (U (Ures))∑
φ (U (Ures))
, (5)
where φ (U(a)) = 1 if U > a and φ (U(a)) = 0 if U ≤ a. The sums are over
all offers seen by the agent in this iteration. Idiosyncratic preferences for these
housings are supposed not to be known by the agent.
Observe that the probability of accepting an apartment increases when the
outside opportunity is less promising and that the accuracy of the appreciation
of this option depends on the number of offers seen. Once a residence is rejected
it cannot be revisited, unless it remains vacant and is randomly reselected.
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All tenant agents participate in the housing market and searching tenant
agents recalculate their reservation utility each iteration. When offered rents
would improve their utility, but this utility is still negative, tenants cannot
accept the housing. These tenants are considered as having a zero utility in the
computation of the average tenant welfare.
3.2 Landlords
Landlords’ have three possible states, having a tenant, on the market and off
the market. The corresponding utilities are, ULocc = R − CL the rent minus
the maintenance cost, ULvac = −CL the cost of a vacancy, and 0 their outside
opportunity, that is the utility they can expect if they withdraw from the market.
Landlords’ decision variable is what rent to post. In making this decision,
they are assumed to trade-off speed of sale with rent procured. Landlords
calculate their most advantageous rent, that is the rent that in expectation
provides the highest benefit per iteration, given that contracts are for fixed rents
and have an exogenous probability 1/X of being terminated each iteration.
The function that gives this expected benefit is BL(R) :
BL(R) =
−CL
X + T (R)
∫ T (R)
0
e−rtdt+
R− CL
X + T (R)
∫ X+T (R)
T (R)
e−rtdt (6)
where r is the discount rate, X is the exogenous expected time a tenant will
stay in the apartment, CL is the maintenance cost per iteration and T (R) is
the expected time-on-the-market, whose calculation is described below.
Equation 6 is rewritten:
BL(R) =
−CL
X + T (R)
[1− exp (−rT (R))] +
R− CL
X + T (R)
[exp (−rT (R)) ∗ (1− exp (−rX))] . (7)
The first line in Equations (6) & (7) is the total expected discounted costs
incurred while searching for a tenant, divided by the full expected time-on-
the-market and residency duration. The second term is the total expected
discounted utility flow during occupancy, divided by the full expected time-on-
the-market and residency duration. Note that the overall time over which the
profit is determined varies with T (R). Average landlord welfare is the average
utility over all landlords.
A landlord is fully described by their identical maintenance costs CL (default
value 100, see Table 3.3.3). The off-market cost associated with ownership is
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normalized to zero3 and hence a landlord is never willing to post a rent below
CL. Landlords may withdraw from the market if they do not expect to benefit
from participation.
Expected time on the market
Landlords can be assumed to be generally aware of the distribution of prices
for similar rented accommodation and to have a somewhat vaguer idea of the
time required to sell an apartment, as this is harder to observe. In their trade-
off between TOM and expected rent flows, landlords need information on the
relationship between both of these elements. Landlords are assumed to have
access to information on a certain percentage of residences on the market over
the last F iterations. Concretely, they know for these residences for how many
iterations they were on the market at their most recent market price, within
the last F iterations. They also know whether or not they have been rented, as
shown in Figure 2.
The above procedure generates two histograms, one of the cumulative times
on the market within each rent interval (of size RI , see Table 3.3.3) and another
of the number of sales within each interval. This allows landlords to calculate
the probability per iteration of finding a tenant for a range of price intervals,
making the implicit assumption that the probability to sell was constant over
the last F iterations. This probability is simply the number of agreed rents
divided by the cumulative times on the market. A constant hazard is assumed,
which means that the landlords assume an exponential probability distribution
for the time-on-the-market for a constant rent, see Kiefer (1988).
The landlords calculate the expected TOM within each rent interval from
the data and estimate the best least-squares fit of the exponential function for
the expected TOM T(R) as a function of the rent R,4
T (R) = α exp(βR) (8)
where α and β are fit parameters.
In the simulations, to avoid errors by landlords that would lengthen search
times for tenant agents, the chosen rent cannot be more than Imax% above
the highest accepted rent seen. The percentage of rent increases equal to the
maximum allowed is near 2% for the default value of Imax = 10, see Figure
20-Right in Appendix A.
Furthermore, in order for landlords to always have enough information to
perceive the basic relation between time-on-the-market and posted rents, a min-
imum number of recent sales in memory is imposed and its default value set to
100.
3This is equivalent to assuming that the expected utility flow in another activity, or ‘outside
opportunity’ is equal to zero.
4Each point T (R) = ω is given a weight equal to the natural logarithm of the number of
rentals N(R) in the rent interval centered on R, plus one, that is weight = ln (N(R) + 1).
This weighting as opposed to a linear weighting gives greater importance to rarer information
(higher agreed rents) and hence leads to a reduction in posted rents.
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expected profits.
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To sum up, landlords require a two dimensional information in order to
trade-off TOM against expected rent. For this information to be useable in
their decision making, it is summarized by means of a statistical fit. We believe
that it is an elegant way to simulate the trade-off between speed of sale and
rent procured made by real landlords who have imperfect information on the
market.
Rent revision
When a residence remains on the market at the end of an iteration, landlords
review their chosen rent with probability 1/F .5 They repeat the procedure
described above and choose the rent that they believe will bring the maximum
profit.
Withdrawing and returning to the market
If the expected profit estimated for a residence is negative, the residence is
withdrawn from the market. Landlords who have withdrawn residences from
the market review the market situation with probability 1/F every iteration,
and return to the market if the expected profit is positive.
3.3 Simulation procedure
3.3.1 Main phase
After an initialization phase described in the next section, our model repeats
the following steps until a steady state is reached:
• Searchers visit a randomly chosen apartment, and accept or reject it.
• A portion of landlords (1/F ) whose apartments remain vacant decide if
they shall change their rent or withdraw from the market.
• A portion of landlords (1/F ) who have withdrawn from the market decide
if they shall return.
• A certain fraction (1/X) of tenants, randomly chosen, leave.
• Landlords of newly empty apartments choose their asking rents.
• The next iteration begins.
5In order to keep the number of parameters in the model as small as possible, we choose
here the same parameter as for the number of sale times seen by landlords. This means that
landlords change their decisions on average every F iterations, which is the same time over
which they consider information on the market state to remain relevant.
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Table 1: Parameters of the Model
Symbol Meaning Default Value of
Parameters
Landlords’ parameters
SL % of sales seen 20%
F Timescale rent changes (and memory) (iterations) 15
Imax Maximum rent increase 10%
CL Maintenance cost 100
Tenants’ parameters
X Expected length of residence (iterations) 240
σ Idiosyncrasy of tenants preferences (% Y ) 5
ST Percentage of offers seen 5%
CT Search costs 200
Y Housing budget [100-198]
General parameters
r Discount rate (default 3% annual rate) 0.0005
size Town size 10000
Z Number of initializing iterations 10
RI Estimation rent interval size 2
3.3.2 Initialization
In order that landlords have some information on the market so that they can
set rents, we use the following initialization procedure. Ten thousand landlords
and tenants are created. The landlords all have an occupancy maintenance cost
CL of 100 and an initial asking rent randomly chosen in the interval 100-120.
The tenant agents have a uniform distribution of housing budgets between 100
and 198 in 50 discrete groups.
Over the first Z iterations, tenant agents see five apartments and select the
lowest asking rent if it offers the agent a positive utility. This preference for
lower rent residences initializes the market in such a way that the information
available to landlords indicates that higher rents mean longer waiting times.
Landlords do not review their rents during the initialization phase. After the Z
initialization iterations are complete, the mechanism described in Section 3.3 is
implemented, in which searchers see only one residence per iteration.
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3.3.3 Parameters
In Table 3.3.3 the parameters of the model are listed, along with their default
values. These values are used in all simulations presented, unless stated oth-
erwise. The parameters listed in Table 3.3.3 along with the distribution of the
housing budgets of tenants defines a simulation run.
The default value of X, the expected length of residence, which can rea-
sonably be assumed as being of the order of 4 years (see de Una-Alvarez et al.
(2008)), means that five iterations corresponds to one month and hence 60 it-
erations represents a year. Hence landlords’ knowledge of recent rentals, F,
stretches three months into the past and they change their rent in expectation
every three months. The default discount rate is equivalent to an annual rate
of 3%. It should be noted that these are simply default values. The effects of
varying the parameters on the steady state configuration are discussed below
and in the Appendix.
4 Results
4.1 Base Case
We present simulation results for a ‘city’ with an inelastic supply of ten thousand
apartments owned by ten thousand different landlords and ten thousand tenant
agents wishing to be accommodated. All the parameters values are the default
values presented in Table 3.3.3.
As can be seen in Figure 4-Left, the basic model converges for any initializa-
tion to a reasonable steady-state with a positive vacancy rate, rent dispersion
and nonzero search times. The vacancy rate is about 15%, and the percentage
of landlords who have withdrawn from the market is negligible. The number of
unhoused tenants is equal to the difference between the ‘Population’, shown in
figures throughout this section, and the total number of tenant agents, which is
ten thousand. The number of landlords searching for tenants is equal to the dif-
ference between the ‘Population’ plus the number of landlords ‘Off the market’
and the total number of landlords, which is again ten thousand.
The dispersion in both accepted and posted rents can be seen in Figure 5-
Left. The curves are the cumulated distributions of rents set and accepted over
15 iterations. In Figure 5-Right we can see that, as expected, lower rents are
more likely to be accepted. Figure 5-Left shows that most landlords offer rents
close to the ‘going rate’. The few who ask higher rents are less likely to find
tenants. As in existing analytical models, the heterogeneity of tenants’ incomes
and the presence of market frictions (undirected search with a unitary arrival
rate of offers) contribute to the dispersion of rents. Additional factors con-
tributing to the dispersion of prices are the idiosyncratic preferences of tenants
and stochastic information effects: agents observe different samples of market
signals and therefore take different decisions. This is particularly true for low
levels of information and for landlords, as will be discussed in Section 4.3.1.
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Figure 4: Left : The steady state population and number of landlords off-the-
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the procedure in Section 3.3.2 with initial rents distributed between 180 and
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as described in Section 3.3.2. Right : The average TOM of residences accepted
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The maximum offered rent by landlords is lower than the maximum reser-
vation rent; it is below 150 in Figure 5-Left. Landlords find that for higher
rents it takes longer to find a tenant (because those tenants with low incomes
can no longer afford it, and wealthier tenants prefer cheaper accommodation)
and so offer relatively low rents. The lower bound of offered rent in our results
is greater than the lowest of the tenants’ housing budgets: although landlords
might get profit with any rent strictly above 100, the minimum offered rent in
our simulation is above 110 and the lowest income tenants are homeless. This
is in part due to high search costs CL (equal to 100) compared to the expected
benefit of having a residence on the market with a low posted rent. The ex-
pected duration of residence is long compared to search times and hence search
costs. For the lowest rents, the gains from minor reductions in search times are
less than the loss from lower rents over the entire residence duration.
Note that at constant population, rent changes are predominately transfers
in surplus between tenants and landlords. The major factors in changing the
total welfare are changes in population or the withdrawal of landlords from the
market.
4.2 Tenants’ Information Level
The percentage of offers seen by each tenant ST is varied between 5 and 100%.
The results show that the population is not greatly affected above a low thresh-
old by alterations in the percentage of offers seen by tenants (Figure 6-Left).
The effects at low levels of information can be seen in Figures 6 & 7-Left. The
percentage of offers seen by tenants ceases to alter the steady state configura-
tion above a threshold value which can be seen to be approximately 0.5% or
5 observations from Figure 7-Right. It appears that a relatively low level of
information gives an accurate impression of the market state to tenants. This
is, in part at least, due to the range of the real distribution of offers being nar-
row. Moreover the fact that searchers renew their information every iteration
excludes any persistence of erroneous perceptions.
Search times of the majority of tenants, with the default level of information
ST = 5%, are of the order of 3 or 4 iterations, as can be seen in Figure 7-Right.
When tenants are very badly informed, they are likely to choose a reservation
utility equal to the best offer seen, which lengthens the TOM. This is because
they expect the additional waiting costs to be very low in comparison to the
expected gain in terms of future rents. We see in comparing Figures 6 & 7-Left
with Figure 7-Right that once the expected search times of tenants cease to
follow the increase in the number of offers seen, the effect of increasing tenants’
information is negligible.
Note finally that increasing tenants’ information from very low levels im-
proves their welfare as they are more likely to refuse higher rents.
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Figure 6: Left : The variations in population and the number of landlords off-
the-market as a function of the percentage of offers seen by tenants. Right : The
average rent and the average TOM.
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4.3 Landlords’ Information Levels
Landlords must choose their posted rent. This decision is based on their mainte-
nance costs but also on their information on the state of the market. Information
is a critical variable in search markets and is costly to obtain. This is why we
now examine the effect of the amount of information available to landlords on
the market outcome. This is done by varying the percentage of times-on-the-
market of recent rentals and of vacant residences seen by landlords SL.
4.3.1 Homogeneous Landlords
Increasing landlords’ information decreases rents, Figure 8-Right. Landlords’
welfare falls, Figure 9-Left, and the population increases, as shown in Figure
8-Left. Figure 9-Right shows that the variance in posted and accepted rents
decreases as landlords see larger (and hence more similar) information samples.
These results highlight the crucial role of landlords’ information.
In order to decide their asking rent, landlords need accurate two dimensional
information, that is rents offered and their associated times-on-the-market.
Landlords’ information on TOM for different rents is based on a finite sam-
ple accumulated over F iterations. The TOM of many residences in each rent
interval are required for accurate estimates of the rent/TOM relationship using
the smoothing procedure (an exponential fit). Indeed for these reasons, their
information is not perfect even with SL = 100%.
6 Furthermore, in a dynamic
market this information may be outdated.
The over-estimations of the optimal rent of less informed landlords, shown
in Figure 10, result from their underestimation of TOM. Ill-informed landlords
6Indeed increasing landlord’s memory F has an effect similar to that of increasing SL at
steady-state, but F plays an important role in dynamic adjustment that is unrelated to SL.
The parameter size also has a role similar to that of SLas the level of information available
to agents depends directly on the size of the city, see Section A.
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Figure 9: Left : The average welfares of tenant and landlord agents are shown for
variations in the level of landlord’s information. Right : The average variance
of the distributions of posted and accepted rents over 1000 iterations, after
convergence to a steady state.
are less likely to see the long waiting times (TOM) for very high rents which
are rarely accepted. This leads to higher asking rents. As the landlords are
homogeneous, and make the same errors on average, this pushes the market
rents upwards. Every high posted rent, if refused by tenants, increases their
expected search times as tenants’ search is undirected. This necessarily affects
searchers’ optimal reservation utilities, pushing the market towards higher rents.
In contrast, increasing landlords’ information makes them sharper competitors,
leading to reduced rents.
4.3.2 Heterogeneous Landlords
In order to further test the effect of landlords’ information on the steady-state
of the market we perform simulations with landlords who are heterogeneous in
information. There are two types of landlord, those with the default level of
information SL = 20 and those with SL = 5, values that were chosen because
Figure 9 shows that the steady state changes significantly between these two
values when they are shared by all landlords.
Figure 11-Right shows the increases in average rents and times-on-the-market
with the proportion of ill-informed landlords. This is because, as described in
Section 4.3.1, errors made by ill-informed landlords tend to lead to higher asking
rents. This changes the distribution seen by tenants who have no option but
to lower their reservation utilities. As a consequence, well-informed landlords
react to the reduced TOM by increasing their offers. Figure 11-Left shows that
consequently the population falls as more landlords are ill-informed. Overall the
welfare reduces because higher rents reduce the population, Figure 12-Right.
In Figure 12-Left we see that, following the rent increase, the welfare of
both types of landlords increases as the proportion of ill-informed landlords
rises. However, the better informed always have higher welfares. This results
from their more accurate appreciation of the state of the market, see Figure
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12-Left. In summary, there are positive externalities (or, more precisely, market
effects) of ill-informed on well-informed landlords, the former moving the market
rent upwards.
4.4 Dynamically varying the discount rate
4.4.1 Discount rate
The discount rate incorporates the value of time, represented by the real interest
rate. 7 The discount rate was varied from less than 1% per annum to over 17%
per annum. Increasing the discount rate means an increase in the impatience
of all agents. That is, at constant rents and TOM, for both categories of agent
the value of a match increases with respect to the value of continuing to search.
More specifically, changing the discount rate alters all four terms in the right-
hand sides of Equations 3 & 6.
There ensues two contradictory effects: Landlords have a tendency to post
lower rents, while tenants are willing to accept higher rents, conditionally on
their income. It is not obvious which of these effects should dominate. In
general, one may anticipate that the effects of changes in the discount rate
depend on the relative influence of tenants and landlords in the market. As
landlords post prices which cannot be negotiated, while tenants decide whether
or not to accept the offer received, we can expect landlords’ decisions to lead
the market.
Figures 13 show that for the default values of the other parameters, the
average rent is lower with a higher discount rate. This shows that changes in
landlords’ behaviour, due to a change in discount rate, have a greater impact
on market outcomes than the corresponding changes in tenants’ behavior. In-
7Note that for our agents only the current discount rate plays a role in their decision. See
Liu and Mei (1994) for a discussion of risk and time-varying expected discount rates.
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Figure 13: Left : The variations in population and the number of landlords off
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Figure 14: The average welfares of tenant and landlord agents are shown for
variations in the annual discount rate.
creases in the discount rate also lead to a reduction in TOM and an increase in
population. Therefore, the average welfare of tenants is improved and that of
landlords dis-improved with increasing discount rates, as can be seen in Figure
14.8
4.4.2 Discount rate shock
The role of information in the context of a dynamic evolution of real estate
markets is an important subject that has already been analyzed empirically by
Fisher et al. (2003), Clayton et al. (2008). In order to examine this question we
introduce exogenous shocks to the discount rate. Two aspects of information
play an important role in the decisions of landlords: Firstly the proportion of
8Simulations with high landlord market power (σ = 2%, SL = 5% and ST = 0.5%), show
that tenants welfare can dis-improve with a rising discount rate but that landlords are always
worse off as the discount rate increases.
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Figure 15: Left : The variations in population, vacancies and the number of
landlords off the market, with the varying discount rate r shown Right. Right :
The exogenous variation of the discount rate and the corresponding average
TOM.
available information seen and secondly the length of their memory. At the
steady state, these two parameters have an equivalent role: both increase the
quantity (and therefore quality) of information. However, in an evolving market,
the length of memory becomes a two-edged sword. It increases the quantity of
information but much of this information may be out-of-date.
The discount rate was varied from 2% to 10% at 1500 iterations and reduced
again to 2% at 3000 iterations. The adjustments in the rent and the TOM
due to the changes in the discount rate can be seen in Figure 15-Right. As
expected from the comparative statics shown in the previous subsection, both
the average rent and TOM reduce after the increase in the discount rate. This
causes an increase in population due to the larger number of tenants who can
afford housing (see Figure 15-Left). Opposing adjustments occur when the
discount rate comes back to its previous value. This gives us the opportunity
of exploring the dynamics of the market in situations of both rising prices and
falling prices.
All landlords who review their rent after the increase at 1500 iterations
immediately account for the change in the discount rate and therefore post
lower rents. Their beliefs on the state of the market evolve more slowly due
to their memory of past transactions. Therefore, as tenants’ reactions to the
new situation are not taken into account immediately, accepted rents reduce
abruptly, see Figure 16-Left.
However, the average TOM of agreed rents reduces considerably more slowly.
Tenants change immediately their reservation utility in reaction to the flow of
new low rents. Therefore the average individual acceptance probability reduces
due to newly increased value of waiting for these particularly low rents. This hin-
ders the decrease in TOM that would otherwise result from the greater number
of tenant agents who can afford housing. Once the rent distribution stabilizes,
that is the newly posted rents cease to be cheaper than those on the market,
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Figure 16: Left : The variations in TOM and average rents, around the transition
of the discount rate from r = 2% to r = 10% at 1000 iterations. Right : The
variations in TOM and average rents, around the transition of the discount rate
from r = 10% to r = 2% at 2000 iterations.
average individual acceptation probabilities increase. We observe in Figure 16-
Left that just before the average TOM reaches its new steady-state value the
rent is at its lowest level. Coupled with the greater number of tenant agents
who can now afford housing, this causes the volume and population to rise until
the new steady-state is reached. Figure 17-Left shows that the population rises
by approximately 250 in 200 iterations, equivalent to about 2 12 years. As the
number of departures is a constant fraction of the population, at the steady-
state the volume of transactions is directly related to the population. While the
population is rising the volume of transactions is greater than at a steady-state
with the same population. Once the rents have ceased to reduce the volume
of transactions increases for a short period, around 1570 iterations, as seen by
the sharp rise in the population in Figure Figure 17-Left. In fact the volume
of transctions increases by over 15% temporarily before lowering to its steady
state value that, like the new population, is approximately 3% above its previ-
ous steady-state value. The higher volume of transactions in conjunction with a
smaller number of vacancies at the new steady-state keep TOM low.9 Changes
in the ratio of transaction volumes to vacancies are an essential element that
differentiate ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ markets.
After the reduction in the discount rate at 3000 iterations opposite adjust-
ments are seen: an increase in average rent, TOM and the vacancy rate with a
decrease in population. A decrease in volume follows from the falling popula-
tion seen in Figure 17-Right. The rent increases immediately as landlords are
instantly informed of the reduction in the discount rate, see Figure 16-Right.
What’s new here is first that the population falls immediately with the increase
9The average TOM for landlords is proportional to the number of vacancies divided by
the volume of transactions in an iteration. Here, the change in TOM is primarily due to
the change in the number of vacancies, which changes by around 20% rather than to the 3%
change in volume.
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Figure 17: Left : The variations in population, vacancies and the number of
landlords off the market, around the transition of the discount rate from r = 2%
to r = 10% at 1000 iterations. Right : The variations in population,vacancies
and the number of landlords off the market, around the transition of the discount
rate from r = 10% to r = 2% at 2000 iterations.
in rent as poorer tenants have a hard income constraint, see Figure 17-Right.
Secondly, there is a marked overshoot in rents, see Figure 16-Right. This can
be attributed to the fact that the eventual negative effects of asking excessive
rents take time to be understood by landlords. This is due to both the low
frequency of acceptation of high rents, which means that they are often unob-
served by individual landlords, and secondarily the relatively long time required
for these durations to happen.
5 Discussion of results
We know that a perfectly competitive market should have rents offered at land-
lords’ maintenance costs (Bertrand price competition): in a situation where
every tenant would be able to choose the best offer among several, any landlord
making an offer below others would very quickly attract a tenant. Rents would
thus be pushed down to landlords’ maintenance costs i.e. at 100. What drives
the market away from this configuration is primarily the frictions due to the
search process. Due to search costs, the matching of a tenant and a landlord
produces a benefit to both of them. Because tenants can visit only one residence
per time unit and accept or refuse it without recall, landlords have the power to
extract a part of this benefit, which explains rents above landlords’ maintenance
costs.
On the opposite, we know from existing theoretical labor-market models
that in a model with frictions and homogeneous workers, the equilibrium would
have a single wage, equal to the workers reservation wage. In this situation,
firms are able to extract the whole surplus from the match and as a result, no
searcher participates in the market, which is known as the Diamond paradox
(Diamond, 1971). However, if workers differ in their reservation wages, due
to heterogeneous outside options for instance, a distribution of wages emerges
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(Albrecht and Axell, 1984, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1990). This also ties in with
the consumer search literature, where price dispersion has been shown to result
from sellers playing mixed strategies against potential buyers who have different
reservation prices, see McMillan and Rothschild (1994). Following an analogous
mechanism, in our housing-market model landlords facing tenants with hetero-
geneous reservation rents react by setting different offers. 10
In contrast to those theoretical models, differences in reservation rents in
our model are not solely the result of heterogeneities in the value of the out-
side option for searchers. They also come from the existence of idiosyncratic
preferences and from the heterogeneity in the information received by different
agents: tenants seeing different samples from the distribution of offers decide
different reservation rents.
Moreover, the distribution of offered rents differs from the uniform distri-
bution of reservation rents: although high income agents can accept any rent
sufficiently below their reservation rent to cover the associated search costs, we
observe that the maximum rent offered by landlords is lower than the maximum
reservation rent. Landlords find that for higher rents it takes longer to find a
tenant (because those tenants with low incomes can no longer afford it, and
wealthier tenants prefer cheaper accommodation which they know to exist from
their information on offered rents) and so offer relatively low rents compared to
richer tenants housing budgets. Existing theoretical models can give us clues
to better understand the distribution of offered and accepted rents. In a search
model with heterogeneous workers, it has been shown that the distribution of
offered wages differs from the distribution of reservation wages because unem-
ployed individuals with high outside opportunity only flow to jobs with high
wages (Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2007). Similarly in our model, high income
agents can accept any rent that is sufficiently below their reservation rent to
cover the associated search costs. In contrast, low budget searchers can only
accept low rent offers. Therefore, the acceptance probability of low rent offers
is higher, which distorts the distribution of offered rents with respect to the
distribution of reservation rents.
Furthermore, Bontemps et al. (1999) demonstrate theoretically that with
heterogeneous searching workers and heterogeneous firms, the minimum offered
wage is higher than the minimum reservation wage. This parallels the obser-
vation in our model that the maximum rent offered by landlords is lower than
the maximum reservation rent. Actually, landlords find that for higher rents it
takes longer to find a tenant (because those tenants with low incomes can no
longer afford it, and wealthier tenants prefer cheaper accommodation) and so
offer relatively low rents compared to richer tenants housing budgets.
What is new in this model with respect to analytical models is that agents
do not have perfect information regarding their expected benefit from waiting.
Moreover, landlords need sufficient information in two dimensions to have an
accurate appreciation of the market state. The dramatic difference in the sen-
10In van der Vlist et al. (2002), the heterogeneity is in tenants having different arrival rate
of offers when housed and when in temporary accommodation.
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sitivity to changes in the two information parameters (ST for tenants and SL
for landlords) is due to the fundamental asymmetry in the market exposed in
Sections 3.1 & 3.2. Landlords individually post prices which cannot be nego-
tiated, while tenants decide whether or not to accept the offer received. The
idiosyncratic preferences of tenants are also absent from the search models cited
in this Section, though they were introduced in housing search models by Arnott
(1989). The addition of these preferences adds an important realistic element
to the model and their stochastic nature has a stabilizing influence. Finally, the
results in section 4.4 shows that this set up allows the analysis of the dynamics
of the housing market, of which the understanding is a key question.
6 Conclusion
Our dynamic model includes imperfect information and heterogeneous interact-
ing agents. It leads to price dispersion, nonzero search times and vacancies,
three essential ingredients of any realistic housing model. The matching proba-
bility depends endogenously on the posted price of apartments. It is a general
equilibrium model that provides a basis for examining policy questions such as
rent control and its welfare and distributional effects, the welfare effects of the
taxation of vacant housing or the general equilibrium effect of providing social
housing.
In our model landlords set rents which tenant agents accept or refuse. This is
a reasonable representation of the rental market. Landlords act upon their par-
tial knowledge of the market in order to maximize their profits. Their knowledge
of the market state is in the form of probable times-on-the-market before renting
for the full range of possible rents. This allows the calculation of the expected
profit and hence rational maximization. The heuristics of real world agents are
simulated here by a regression and profit calculation, with a larger number of
individual information points than real agents normally know. Greater informa-
tion for landlords dis-improves their overall utility due to greater competition.
Tenants, with idiosyncratic preferences and heterogeneous in income, are
also partially informed of the state of the market and use their information to
decide the minimum utility they are willing to accept from a residence. Their
search is undirected, that is they have equal probability of visiting any available
offer in a given iteration. Greater information for tenants improves their overall
welfare. We have examined the comparative static and dynamic effects of a
change in the discount rate.
Our main aim has been to construct a model that allows hypotheses on the
functioning of the urban rental market to be investigated. We believe that a
dynamic model based on straightforward micro-economic behaviors with imper-
fect information is a good approach. We have found robust and simple agent
dynamics (or rules) that reproduce the essential features of the rental housing
market and results from analytical search models that have been developed to
analyze labor as well as housing markets.
One of the most interesting possible extensions is to alter the number of
28
units owned by landlords. Heterogeneities in the level of information among
landlords could represent the difference between large commercial landowners,
who would also have greater private information, and small private owners. For
example, large landlords are likely to be better able to absorb vacancies (as
discussed by Blanck and Winnock (1953)), and more able to adapt their rental
strategies to market conditions.
Making the tenant side of the market open - that is having a constant flow of
arrivals of tenant agents - instead of a fixed number of searching tenants would
allow the composition of the town to be more endogenous. This would also mean
that the vacancy rate would represent market frictions only and not a mixture
of market frictions and those tenants who are unable to pay market rates as is
currently the case. Transferring our model to one where tenant agents engage
in directed search is also a promising extension.
The current set-up allows the investigation of the distributive effects of policy
decisions among tenant agents of varying incomes. Rent control is one possible
example, as is the level of information among tenants. These two effects have
been examined in static simulation models by Bradburd et al. (2005, 2006). It
would be interesting to test whether the effects are similar in our more realistic
model.
There is great scope to complexify the model for both types of agent. Ten-
ants could be differentiated by their work places, housing preferences, house-
hold sizes, transportation modes etc. Landlords could own different numbers of
apartments, and apply different rent setting rules.
Acknowledgements We thank Nicolas Coulombel for useful comments on
an earlier draft of this paper. We also gratefully acknowledge discussions with
Sebastien Grauwin and Remi Lemoy.
References
J.W. Albrecht and B. Axell. An equilibrium-model of search unemployment.
Journal of Political Economy, 92(5):824–840, 1984.
M.T. Allen, R.C. Rutherford, and T.A. Thomson. Residential asking rents and
time on the market. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 38:
351–365, 2009.
P.M. Anglin, R. Rutherford, and T.M. Springer. The trade-off between the
selling price of residential properties and time-on-the-market: The impact of
price setting. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 26(1):95–111,
2003.
R. Arnott. Housing vacancies, thin markets, and idiosyncratic tastes. Journal
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2:5–30, 1989.
G. Ballot. Modeling the labor market as an evolving institution: model artemis.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 49(1):51–77, 2002.
29
D.M. Blanck and L. Winnock. The structure of the housing market. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 67:181–203, 1953.
C. Bontemps, J.M. Robin, and G.J. Van den Berg. An empirical equilibrium
job search model with search on the job and heterogeneous workers and firms.
International Economic Review, 40(4):1039–1074, 1999.
R. Bradburd, S. Sheppard, J. Bergeron, E. Engler, and E. Gee. The distribu-
tional impact of housing discrimination in a non-walrasian setting. Journal
of Housing Economics, 14(2):61–91, 2005.
R. Bradburd, S. Sheppard, J. Bergeron, and E. Engler. The impact of rent con-
trols in non-walrasian markets: An agent-based modeling approach. Journal
of Regional Science, 46(3):455–491, 2006.
K. Burdett and D.T. Mortensen. Equilibrium wage differentials and employer
size. Discussion Paper no. 860, Northwestern University, 1989.
K Burdett and D.T. Mortensen. Wage differentials, employer size, and unem-
ployment. International Economic Review, 39(2):257–273, 1998.
P. Cheng, Z. Lin, and Y. Liu. Home price, time-on-market,
and seller heterogeneity under changing market conditions. The
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2009. URL
http://www.springerlink.com/content/qg0981w224236176/.
J. Clayton, G. MacKinnon, and L. Peng. Time variation of liquidity in the
private real estate market: An empirical investigation. Journal of Real Estate
Research, 30(2):125–160, 2008.
J. de Una-Alvarez, R. Arevalo-Tome, and M.S. Otero-Giraldez. Non-
parametric estimation of households duration of residence from panel
data. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2008. URL
http://www.springerlink.com/content/955q5p05u3064025/ (visited
the 09/05/2009).
G. Desgranges and E. Wasmer. Appariements sur le marche du logement. An-
nales d’economie et de statistique, (58):253–287, 2000.
P.A. Diamond. Model of price adjustment. Journal of Economic Theory, 3(2):
156–168, 1971.
Z. Eckstein and G.J. Van den Berg. Empirical labor search: A survey. Journal
of Econometrics, 136(2):531–564, 2007.
Z. Eckstein and K.I. Wolpin. Estimating a market equilibrium search model
from panel data on individuals. Econometrica, 58(4):783–808, 1990.
J. Fisher, D. Gatzlaff, D. Geltner, and D. Haurin. Controlling for the impact
of variable liquidity in commercial real estate price indices. Real Estate Eco-
nomics, 31(2):269–303, 2003.
30
S.A. Gabriel and F.E. Nothaft. Rental housing markets and the natural vacancy
rate. American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Journal, 16(4):
419–429, 1988.
SR Grenadier. The persistence of real-estate cycles. Journal of Real Estate
Finance And Economics, 10(2):95–119, 1995.
M. Hwang and J.M. Quigley. Economic fundamentals in local housing markets:
Evidence from us metropolitan regions. Journal of Regional Science, 46(3):
425–453, 2006.
M. Igarashi. The rent-vacancy relationship in the rental housing market. Journal
of Housing Economics, 1:251–270, 1991.
N.M. Kiefer. Economic duration data and hazard functions. Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 26(2):646–679, 1988.
A.P. Kirman. Whom or what does the representative individual represent. Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 6(2):117–136, 1992.
J.R. Knight. Listing price, time on market, and ultimate selling price: Causes
and effects of listing price changes. Real Estate Economics, 30(2):213–237,
2002.
C.H. Liu and J. Mei. An analysis of real-estate risk using the present value
model. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 8:5–20, 1994.
J. McMillan and M. Rothschild. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic
Applications - Volume 2, chapter Search, pages 905–927. Elsevier, 1994.
A. Merlo and F. Ortalo-Magne. Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence
from england. Journal of Urban Economics, 56(2):192–216, 2004.
D.T. Mortensen. Panel Data and Labor Market Studies, chapter Equilibrium
wage distributions: a synthesis. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1990.
D.T. Mortensen. Panel Data and Structural Labor Market Models, chapter Equi-
librium Unemployment with Wage Posting. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2000.
D.T. Mortensen and C.A. Pissarides. Job creation and job destruction in the
theory of unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies, 61(3):397–415,
1994.
C. Pissarides. Equilibrium unemployment theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
F. Postel-Vinay and J.-M. Robin. Advances in Economics and Econometrics:
Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, chapter Microeconometric
Search-Matching Models and Matched Employer-Employee Data, pages 279–
310. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
31
C. Read. Tenants search and vacancies in rental housing markets. Regional
Science and Urban Economics, 23(2):171–183, 1993.
C. Read. Vacancies and rent dispersion in a stochastic search model with gen-
eralized tenant demand. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 15
(3):223–237, 1997.
R. Rogerson, R. Shimer, and R. Wright. Search theoretic models of the labour
market: A survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 63:959–988, 2005.
K.T. Rosen and L.B. Smith. The price-adjustment process for rental housing
and the natural vacancy rate. American Economic Review, 73(4):779–786,
1983.
J.D. Shilling, C.F. Sirmans, and J.B. Corgel. Price adjustment process for rental
office space. Journal of Urban Economics, 22(1):90–100, 1987.
A.J. van der Vlist, P. Rietveld, and P. Nijkamp. Residential search and mobility
in a housing market equilibrium model. The Journal of Real Estate Finance
and Economics, 24(3):277–299, 2002.
W.C. Wheaton. Vacancy, search, and prices in a housing market matching
model. Journal of Political Economy, 98(6):1270–1292, 1990.
A. Yavas and S. Yang. The strategic role of listing price in marketing real-estate
- theory and evidence. Real Estate Economics, 23(3):347–368, 1995.
A Sensitivity tests
• The size parameter determines the number of both landlords and tenants
in the closed town. It plays an important role in model as the quantity of
information available to agents is affected by their number. Increases in
the size parameter, seen in Figure 18-Left. therefore have an effect similar
to that of increasing the landlords’ information. This finite size effect is a
reasonable feature of the model.
• The parameter σ determines the level of idiosyncrasy of tenant agents’
preferences for housing. Increases in this parameter cause a greater sort-
ing among tenants and the accommodation they prefer, however landlords
capitalize on tenants greater aggregate willingness-to-pay by raising rents.
The rise in rents, see Figure 18-Right, reduces tenant agents’ average wel-
fare.
• Tenants’ information ST has less affect on the steady-state than landlords’
information reflecting the relative market power of both category of agent.
Increases in ST benefit tenants by decreasing rents and hence increasing
their welfare, see Figures 6-Right and 7. Appendix 4.2 presents the effects
of tenants information levels in more detail, it is notable that the positive
effect of increasing ST saturates at low levels.
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• Increases in the discount rate r increase the impatience of both agent types
but as landlords are more influential in the market average rents fall with
rising r, see Section 4.4.1.
• The length of landlords memory F , which also determines the regularity
of rent updates, plays a similar influence on the steady-state as that of the
parameter of landlords’ information, see Figure 19-Left and Section 4.3.1.
That is, when landlords have longer memories they are better informed.
However, the repartition between memory length and vision of the market
is not neutral during dynamic adjustments of the market, see Section 4.4.2.
• When the landlords’ maintenance costs CL are below the tenants’ housing
budgets changes to these costs play a secondary role, see Figure 19-Right.
They can move the market slightly but do not change landlords’ partic-
ipation decisions. Once the maintenance costs rise above poorer tenants
agents’ housing budgets significant effects are seen. Many landlords with-
draw from the market due to the effective drop in demand which lengthens
TOM.
• Increasing the expected duration of residence X decreases the relative
weight of search costs for both types of agent. Landlords search times
(TOM) are generally longer than those of tenants. They have a greater
influence on the market, as their decisions determine the choice set of ten-
ants, and so as X increases the capture more of the increase in surplus as
rents rise, see Figure 20-Left. This has the effect of reducing the popula-
tion as some tenants can no longer afford the market rents. The average
TOM also increases.
• The maximum possible increase above the highest rent observed Imax
plays a small role as the proportion of maximum increases is low for all
but very low values of Imax, see Figure 20-Right. Once Imax is above 3%
increases in the parameter do not effect the steady-state configuration.
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Figure 18: Left : The variations in average rent and the average TOM as a
function the size of the simulation. Right : The variations in average rent and
the average TOM as a function tenants’ idiosyncratic preferences.
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Figure 19: Left : The variations in average rent and the average TOM as a
function the length of landlords’ memory. Right : The variations in average rent
and the average TOM as a function of landlords’ maintenance costs.
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Figure 20: Left : The variations in average rent and the average TOM as a
function the expected duration of residence. Right : The percentage of maxi-
mum rent increases averaged over 1000 iterations as a function of the maximum
possible rent increase parameter, see Section 3.2.
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